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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SYSTEMIC
RISK REGULATION
HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONERt
I. INTRODUCTION
The list of causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis is long, varied, and
the subject of debate. Just as we continue to debate the causes of the
Great Depression, we will likely continue to debate the causes of the
2008 Financial Crisis for many years to come. A common list of fail-
ures contributing to the Financial Crisis includes: global imbalances
(excess savings in some countries and excess borrowing in others), er-
roneous monetary policy (sustained ultra-low interest rates), financial
innovation (for example, the reliance on securitization of mortgages),
risk management and internal control failure, market discipline fail-
ure, and regulatory failure.'
This Article does not attempt to decide the relative importance of
any of these or other factors. This Article does assume, as discussed
below, that regulatory failure is an important cause. The United
States Congress directed the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
("FCIC")2 to examine, inter alia, the role of "[flederal and State finan-
cial regulators, including the extent to which they enforced, or failed
to enforce statutory, regulatory, or supervisory requirements."3 The
FCIC must submit its report to Congress later this year. Still, it ap-
pears fairly evident that our regulatory system failed to prevent a
costly crisis. Of course, some might argue that the regulatory system
failed because of its overactive role in financial markets. Others
would claim that the regulatory system underestimated and under-
regulated risk. Either way, the regulatory system failed to protect the
economy from a significant systemic meltdown.
t Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
I thank Rick Acker and Nick Akers for their helpful comments and Tim Mueller for his
excellent research assistance.
1. For a more complete discussion of the possible causes of the Global Financial
Crisis, see HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULA.
TION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 280-84 (Elsevier 2010).
2. With the passage of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Con-
gress established a bi-partisan commission, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, to
examine the causes, domestic and global, of the financial crisis. The Commission's re-
port is due to Congress and the President on December 15, 2010.
3. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5(c)(1)(B),
123 Stat. 1617, 1629 (2009).
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Wise commentators note that reform is premature when the exact
nature and causes of the financial crisis are yet to be determined.
4
Yet, proposals for regulatory reform hit the streets before anyone
knew the extent of the crisis. The United States Department of the
Treasury ("Treasury") released its Blueprint for a Modernized Finan-
cial Regulatory Structure ("Blueprint")5 while President Bush was
still in office and while the depth of the crisis remained unrealized.
Soon after the election of President Obama, Treasury outlined a pro-
posal that accounted for the full measure of the crisis.6 On July 21,
2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act 7 (hereinafter the "Dodd-Frank Act").
The Dodd-Frank Act will have far-reaching impact on the financial
services industry. The exact impact of the Dodd-Frank Act will not be
known for some time because many of the implementation details
have been left to rulemaking by the various regulatory agencies. This
Article will focus on the key provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that are
most directly linked to regulating systemic risk.
The Dodd-Frank Act does not sufficiently address the problem of
agency discretion generally, or the problem of an agency's discretion to
forebear, in particular. This seems a striking omission given the find-
ings of the Congressional Oversight Panel ("COP") and other research
concluding that the regulatory failure in the 2008 Financial Crisis was
not caused by agencies' lack of regulatory authority (although the lack
of statutory authority may have played a limited role).8 Rather, the
agencies exercised their considerable discretion in favor of not regulat-
ing. As discussed below, an agency might choose to refrain from en-
forcing existing laws or writing new regulations for many reasons.
The public interest may justify some of those reasons but may not jus-
tify others. Nevertheless, it seems that agencies will always have con-
siderable discretion and that an effective regulatory regime should
include some check on that discretion. This Article focuses specifically
on the issue of agency enforcement and considers whether private
monitoring could enhance the current public enforcement regime.
Part II discusses the nature of systemic risk and the realization in the
wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis that existing forms of prudential
4. Saule T. Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risk, Rules, and Institutions: A Process
for Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881 (2009).
5. U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Blueprint For A Modernized Financial Regulatory
Structure (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/
Blueprint.pdf.
6. U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation: Re-
building Financial Supervision and Regulation (June 17, 2009), available at http:/!
www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport web.pdf.
7. Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010).
8. See infra Part IV.
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regulation did not adequately address systemic risk. Part III briefly
overviews the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that seek better regu-
lation of systemic risk. Part IV discusses the preliminary findings re-
garding the causes of the 2008 Financial Crisis which conclude that
regulatory failure was an important element. Part V discusses the
current mechanism for public enforcement of prudential regulation.
Part VI considers whether private enforcement might serve as a valu-
able enhancement to the public enforcement regime. Part VII pro-
poses a hybrid public/private qui tam model of enforcement as a
potentially valuable enhancement to systemic risk reform.
II. SYSTEMIC RISK
The 2008 Financial Crisis spawned a cottage industry in the busi-
ness of defining systemic risk.9 Systemic risk may serve as a strange
reminder of the only thing that many lawyers know about the law of
obscenity-you can't define it but you know it when you see it. 10 Sys-
temic risk seems to suffer from the opposite limitation. While sys-
temic risk can be defined as a general matter, identifying the
emergence of such risk is a significant challenge. 1 ' The nature of a
9. This implies, of course, that no common definition has yet to emerge. See gen-
erally European Central Bank, The Concept of Systemic Risk, Fin. Stability Rev., Dec.
2009, at 134. For further discussions of the definition of systemic risk, see: Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Ad-
dress: Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549 (2009); Jean-
Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, Systemic Risk, Clare Distin-
guished Lecture in Economics and Public Policy at the Clare College, University of
Cambridge (Dec. 10, 2009) http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/
sp091210_l1.en.html; John B. Taylor, Professor of Economics, Senior Fellow at the Hoo-
ver Institution, Stanford University, Dinner Keynote Speech at the Conference on Fi-
nancial Innovation and Crises, Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Systemic Risk and the
Role of Government (May 12, 2009) http://www.stanford.edu/-johntayl/SystemicRisk_
and the Role of Government-May12_2009.pdf; Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Con-
tainment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009); Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open
Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Finan-
cial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009); Amir E. Khandani, Andrew W. Lo, & Robert C.
Merton, Systemic Risk and the Refinancing Ratchet Effect, (Harvard Business School,
Working Paper 10-023, 2009).
10. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart wrote "I shall not today attempt fur-
ther to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it " Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
11. Peter Wallison makes a similar observation. He writes:
W]hile the terms 'systemic risk' or 'systemic breakdown' can be defined in
words, they cannot be used as an effective guide for policy action. We have no
way of knowing when or under what circumstance the failure of a particular
company will cause something as serious as a systemic breakdown - as distin-
guished from a simple disruption in the economy.
Peter J. Wallison, TARP Baby: The Administration's Resolution Authority for Nonbank
Financial Firms, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RES., FIN. SERVS OUTLOOK,Sept.
2009, at 2.
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systemic crisis may not be adequately captured or understood without
years of retrospective analysis. Moreover, government action to stave
off systemic crisis may prevent a crisis from occurring. Thus, we may
never know whether there would have been a systemic event in the
absence of such intervention.
In a recent report to the G20 by the International Monetary Fund,
Bank for International Settlements, and Financial Stability Board,
systemic risk is defined as "the disruption to the flow of financial ser-
vices that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial
system; and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative conse-
quences for the real economy." 12 The reforms addressed in this Arti-
cle are an attempt to mitigate such risk.
Of course, governments have long attempted to prevent systemic
crisis. The primary mechanism for traditional systemic risk regula-
tion has been the prudential regulation of banks. Prudential, or some-
times called "safety and soundness," regulation traditionally sought to
prevent systemic crisis by protecting banks from failure. 13 The 2008
Financial Crisis, however, challenged the assumption that systemic
risk could be addressed by attempting to protect the solvency of indi-
vidual banks (what is now called a "micro-prudential" approach to reg-
ulation). Markus Brunnermeier et al. wrote:
The current approach to systemic regulation implicitly as-
sumes that we can make the system as a whole safe by simply
trying to make sure that individual banks are safe. This
sounds like a truism, but in practice it represents a fallacy of
composition. In trying to make themselves safer, banks, and
often highly leveraged financial intermediaries, can behave
in a way that collectively undermines the system. Selling an
asset when the price of risk increases, is a prudent response
from the perspective of an individual bank. But if many
banks act in this way, the asset price will collapse, forcing
institutions to take yet further steps to rectify the situation.
It is, in part, the responses of the banks themselves to such
pressures that leads to generalised declines in asset prices,
and enhanced correlations and volatility in asset markets. 14
12. International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, Financial
Stability Board, Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Governors, Guidance to Assess the
Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Consid-
erations, Oct. 2009, at 5-6, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf.
13. For a complete discussion of the foundation for the prudential regulation of
banks, see HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULA-
TION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES xii-xxi (Elsevier 2010).
14. MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER ANDREW CROCKETT, CHARLES GOODHART, AVINASH
D. PERSAUD, & H' JN SONG SHIN, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULA-
TION, GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 11 vii Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research
2009.
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This observation regarding the nature of systemic risk highlights
two general deficiencies in our current system of regulation. First,
banks are not the only systemically important financial institutions.
Other financial institutions, such as investment banks and hedge
funds, can also contribute to systemic crisis. Second, protecting the
solvency of a financial institution does not always prevent systemic
risk since a firm may take steps to protect its own solvency (for exam-
ple, by selling assets), and that action, if repeated by other firms, may
be what triggers the systemic crisis. Therefore, many reform propos-
als highlight the importance of adding a macro-prudential focus to the
traditional micro-prudential regimes. Stated another way, such new
regulatory regimes would not only focus on the solvency of commercial
banks (micro-prudential) but would also consider the impact of the ac-
tivities of all financial institutions on the financial system and real
economy (macro-prudential). 15
The purpose of this Article is not, however, to make the case for
reform or expansion of systemic risk regulation. 16 The challenges to
developing such a system are great especially given the potential for
increasing moral hazard once systemic firms or activities are identi-
fied. As discussed in Part III, the Dodd-Frank Act adopts a
macroprudential approach, and this Article does not attempt to decide
whether the substance of that approach is ideal. Rather, this Article
focuses on the question of whether reforms like those in the Dodd-
Frank Act can be enhanced by including enforcement mechanisms
outside of the existing public enforcement system.
III. SYSTEMIC RISK REFORM PROPOSALS
Lawmakers and scholars continue to develop and refine their pro-
posals for regulatory reform. Many of the proposals would have far-
reaching impact on the financial services industry. Below is a very
brief overview of the United States' efforts to enhance the regulation
of systemic risk. United States' reforms address the limitations of the
existing micro-prudential approach to systemic risk by expanding reg-
ulation to include firms other than banks and to focus on activities
other than those primarily related to bank solvency.
In July of 2009, President Obama's Administration ("Administra-
tion") delivered its proposed systemic risk legislation to the United
15. For a discussion of the outlines of a macro-prudential regime, see BRUN-
NERMEIER ET AL, supra note 14, at 25-30.
16. For a comprehensive discussion of current reform proposals, see Lawrence A.
Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A
Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 39
(2009).
2010]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
States Congress.1 7 This proposal created a Financial Services Over-
sight Council, made up of eight members from the heads of each of the
principle federal financial institution regulators, and replaced the
President's Working Group on Financial Markets. The United States
Federal Reserve would be tasked with regulating "Tier I" financial
holding companies, i.e., any "financial firm whose combination of size,
leverage, interconnectedness could pose a threat to financial stability
if it failed."' 8 Regulation of Tier I companies would be stricter than
for other financial firms by imposing higher capital requirements,
stronger liquidity, and more conservative risk management. The su-
pervision of Tier I firms would be macro-prudential in that it would
focus on risks to the system as a whole. Finally, the Administration's
plan recommended the creation of a resolution regime for failing Tier I
financial holding companies modeled on the existing special resolution
regime under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
The Dodd-Frank Act adopts many of the important elements of
the Obama Administration's reform proposals. It creates a Financial
Stability Oversight Council' 9 to identify systemic risk, to promote
market discipline by eliminating expectations of government support,
and to respond to emerging threats to U.S. financial stability.20
Among many duties enumerated under Section 112(a)(2) of the Dodd-
Frank Act, the Council shall require Federal Reserve supervision of
systemically significant nonbank financial companies (hereinafter
"systemic nonbank financial companies")2 1 and make recommenda-
17. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treas., Fact Sheet: Admin. Regulatory Reform
Agenda Moves Forward, TG-227 (July 22, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
tg227.htm.
18. U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Fin. Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuild-
ing Fin. Supervision and Regulation, 10 (undated), available at http://www.financial
stability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf.
19. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111(b) (2010). Section 111(b) provides
that the Council consists of the following voting members: The Secretary, the Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection (a new bureau of the Federal Reserve established
under the Dodd-Frank Act), Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission,
Chairperson of the FDIC, Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Chairman of the National Credit
Union Administration Board, and an independent member with insurance experience
appointed by the President upon advice and consent of the Senate. Nonvoting members
of the Council include the Director of the Office of Financial Research (a new office of
the Treasury established under the Dodd-Frank Act), the Director of the Federal Insur-
ance Office (a new office of the Treasury created under the Dodd-Frank Act), a State
insurance commissioner, a State banking supervisor, and a State securities
commissioner.
20. Id. at § 111(a)(1).
21. Prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve supervised
bank holding companies, but not nonbank financial companies. A bank holding com-
pany is a company that owns or controls a bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a). For these pur-
998 [Vol. 43
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tions to the Federal Reserve regarding the imposition of heightened
prudential standards on systemic nonbank financial companies and
large, interconnected bank holding companies. The Council may de-
termine that systemic nonbank financial holding companies should be
subjected to Federal Reserve heightened supervision if "material fi-
nancial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature,
scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of activi-
ties of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a threat to the
financial stability of the United States."2 2
Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the Federal Re-
serve shall impose more stringent prudential standards to systemic
nonbank financial companies and bank holding companies with assets
of $50 billion or more. The Federal Reserve is required to establish
more stringent prudential standards in the following areas: risk-based
capital requirements and leverage limits; 2 3 liquidity requirements;
overall risk management requirements; resolution plan 24 and credit
exposure report; and concentration limits. The Federal Reserve may
impose more stringent prudential standards which include contingent
capital, enhanced disclosure, short-term debt limits, and such other
prudential standards as the Federal Reserve or Council determines is
appropriate.
poses, a "bank" is generally an FDIC insured commercial bank, but (along with
numerous other exceptions) not an insured thrift. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c).
22. Dodd-Frank Act, § 113(a)(1). The Council's determination is subject to judicial
review. Section 113(h).
23. The Federal Reserve may avoid the imposition of enhanced risk-based capital
requirements or leverage limits if the Federal Reserve, in consultation with the Council,
determines that such requirements would be inappropriate for a particular company
given its activities or structure, in which case, the Federal Reserve shall impose other,
similar, standards. Section 165(b). Upon a finding by the Council that a systemically
important nonbank financial company or a large bank holding company poses a grave
threat to U.S. financial stability, the Federal Reserve must require such company to
maintain a debt to equity ratio of no more than 15 to 1. Section 1650).
24. Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides that resolution plans shall in-
clude: (1) information regarding the manner and extent to which any insured deposi-
tory institution affiliated with the systemically important nonbank financial company
or large bank holding company is adequately protected from risks arising from the ac-
tivities of any nonbank subsidiaries of the company; (2) a full description of the owner-
ship structure, assets, liabilities, and contractual obligations; (3) "identification of cross-
guarantees tied to different securities, identification of major counterparties, and a pro-
cess for determining to whom the collateral of the company is pledged;" and (4) any
other information that the Federal Reserve and the FDIC jointly require by rule or or-
der. Prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC initiated the formal
rulemaking, under then-existing law, with regard to resolution plans. The FDIC is
seeking comment on a proposed rule requiring certain insured depository institutions
that are subsidiaries of large, complex parent companies to submit resolution plans to
the FDIC which demonstrate the insured institution's ability to be separated from its
parent company and to be wound down or resolved in an orderly fashion. FDIC, Special
Reporting, Analysis and Contingent Resolution Plans at Certain Large Insured Deposi-
tory Institutions, 75 Federal Register 27464 (May 17, 2010).
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IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
AGENCY DISCRETION AND FORBEARANCE
Regulatory regimes are not self-executing. The reforms discussed
above require the support of institutions and the people employed by
those institutions to achieve implementation. With regard to the im-
plementation of systemic risk reform, much of the debate leading up to
the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act centered on institutional structure,
i.e., the design and identification of the agency to be responsible for
systemic risk. For example, some reformers contend that systemic
risk should be the responsibility of the United States Federal Reserve
Board, while others propose a new regulatory body.
Of course, institutional design is important and can have a posi-
tive or negative impact on the effectiveness of an agency. The inde-
pendence of an agency 25 from political pressure is often seen as a key
to its effectiveness. 26 The need for adequate resources cannot be un-
derestimated. 2 7 Clear goals and accountability are also fundamental
to the agencies' success. 28 Yet, even in a regulatory regime in which
the administrative agency or agencies are established with the opti-
mal institutional structure, 29 the effectiveness of the regime will be
limited. Even an independent agency will not be immune from politi-
cal pressure. An appropriations-funded agency, as opposed to one
funded from fees collected from the firms it regulates, will not ignore
25. For a discussion of the relative independence of the federal banking agencies,
see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to
Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 71-72 (2005); For a discus-
sion of the importance of agency independence to the structure of prudential regulation,
see Steven. A. Remirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
503 (2000).
26. Some have argued that the lack of agency independence was a contributing
factor in the 1980s savings and loan crisis. See Rosa Maria Lastra, Central Banking
and Banking Regulation, 55 LONDON SCH. ECON. 329 (1996) (contending "that the US
Savings and Loan Associations' debacle might have been prevented or at least mitigated
had non-political considerations more firmly prevailed in their supervision").
27. For an interesting discussion of the role that the lack of SEC resources may
have played in the Bernie Madoff scandal, see Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the
Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in Search of a Story, 4-6 (Georgetown Law, Faculty
Working Papers, Research Paper No. 1475433, 2009).
28. Michael Taylor, an international expert on agency structure, writes "each regu-
latory agency should have a clear and unambiguous mandate and should have a specific
objective for which it can be held accountable." Michael Taylor, Twin peaks, FINANCIAL
WORLD, Sept. 2009, https://www.financialworld.co.uk/financial-world/Archive/2009/
2009_09sept/Features/Michael%2OTaylor/pdf'17268.pdf.
29. A recent Government Accountability Office report found that "A regulatory sys-
tem should ensure that regulators have independence from inappropriate influence;
have sufficient resources, clout, and authority to carry out and enforce statutory mis-
sions; and are clearly accountable for meeting regulatory goals." GAO, FINANCIAL REGU-
LATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE
OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM, GAO-09-216, at 59-60 (Jan. 2009).
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the interests of the industry.30 Moreover, agencies will always have
limits to their funding and therefore be forced to make difficult choices
regarding resource allocation.
An agency's effectiveness is not only limited by its structure.
Agencies, despite their design, exercise a great deal of discretion.
Sometimes that discretion is not exercised in the public interest. Cer-
tainly, the improper exercise of agency discretion can be the result of
incompetence or corruption. But, perhaps more likely, and therefore
more troubling, is the fact that the sub-optimal exercise of agency dis-
cretion may be influenced by less salient human characteristics such
as optimism, confidence, fear, or pessimism. Agencies are often criti-
cized for their forbearance on the one hand, and over-zealousness on
the other. Fundamentally, agency behavior is pro-cyclical. Agencies
will be more likely to loosen their supervision, regulation, and enforce-
ment when the markets are stable or on the upswing. They will be
more aggressive in their supervision, regulation, and enforcement
when markets and the economy are volatile or in a downturn.
Recognizing the importance of agency discretion, Markus Brun-
nermeier et al. called for rules seeking to eliminate some of that
discretion:
[W]e propose ... that objective criteria and pre-specified rules
should be put forward to guarantee that financial regulation
is strictly enforced. To ensure that the enforcement of these
rules are credible, regulators must face the right incentive
structure and enjoy a degree of independence that allows
them to impose potentially unpopular steps. When everyone
is calling for more regulation, e.g., as now, just after a crisis,
it is not needed at all, since bank managers are timid and risk
averse. When regulation is needed, no on wants it, because
asset prices are rising, there is a boom, everybody is optimis-
tic, and regulation just gets in the way ... Almost every reg-
ulator/supervisor will seek maximum discretion. Because of
the above considerations, regulation should be based on pre-
set rules; otherwise, few regulator/supervisors will actually
dare to face the odium of tightening in boom conditions.
3 1
Significantly, the United States Congress tried to eliminate
agency discretion when it passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration Improvement Act of 199132 ("FDICIA"). FDICIA, passed in
the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s, directed the
30. Of course, political and industry pressure on regulatory agencies is not always
contrary to the public interest. On the other hand, such pressures are often not consis-
tent with the public interest.
31. BRUNNERMEIER, CROCKETT, GOODHART, PERSAUD, & SHIN, supra note 14, at 33.
32. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. 1811).
2010] 1001
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federal banking agencies to exercise prompt corrective action once a
bank fails to meet certain defined capital 33 and safety and soundness
("S/S") standards.3 4 Professor Lawrence G. Baxter noted that as a re-
sult of FDICIA
the regulators have been stripped of their discretion to use
capital levels and S/S ratings as merely relevant factors in
their overall assessment of what enforcement or seizure ac-
tion (if any) to take against troubled institutions. Instead,
capital levels and S/S ratings have been transformed into
triggers for the mandatory action by the regulators.
3 5
One study found that FDICIA's prompt corrective action provisions
("PCA") did result in higher capital ratios and reduced portfolio risk.3 6
Yet, PCA clearly did not prevent the recent crisis. 37 One reason may
be the micro-prudential focus of PCA which, the recent crisis has
shown, is too narrow in its approach to systemic risk. In addition to
33. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2008). Prompt corrective action rules require bank regula-
tors to place critically undercapitalized institutions in conservatorship or receivership
within ninety days, unless the supervisor and the FDIC determine that other action
would better serve the purposes of the statute. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(h)(3). Such determina-
tion may only be made if the bank (1) has a positive net worth; (2) is in substantial
compliance with an approved capital restoration plan; (3) is profitable or has an upward
trend in earnings; and (4) has reduced its ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans.
Moreover, the exception to mandatory conservatorship or receivership only applies if
the head of the appropriate banking agency and the chairman of the bank's board cer-
tify that the institution is viable and not expected to fail. 12 U.S.C. § 1831(h)(3)(c)(ii).
Critically undercapitalized banks are subject also to certain mandatory operating con-
straints such as prohibitions on paying excessive compensation or bonuses. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831(i).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-l(e)(1). If the appropriate banking agency determines that a
bank has failed to meet the prescribed standards, the agency will require the institution
to submit an acceptable plan specifying the steps that the institution will take to correct
the deficiency. If the bank fails to submit an acceptable plan, or materially fails to
implement a plan accepted by the agency, the agency must require the institution to
correct the deficiency and may take supervisory action against the bank. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831p-l(e)(2).
35. Lawrence G. Baxter, Administrative and Judicial Review of Prompt Corrective
Action Decisions by the Federal Banking Regulators, 7 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 505, 528
(1994) (emphasis added).
36. RAJ AGGARDWAL & KEVIN T. JACQUES, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PROMPT COR-
RECTIVE ACTION ON BANK CAPITAL AND RISK, FED. RES. BANK OF NEW YORK ECON. POL'Y
REV., Vol 4, No. 3 (Oct. 1998).
37. Rosengren and Peek predicted that PCA would not prevent the next banking
crisis. Eric S. Rosengren & Joe Peek, Will Legislated Early Intervention Prevent the
Next Banking Crisis? (B.C. Working Papers in Econs., 1996), available at http:l
ssrn.com/abstact=34580. They studied the New England banking crisis which occurred
just prior to the passage of FDICIA. They concluded that if FDICIA's PCA provisions
had been law prior to the New England banking crisis, it would have had little impact.
They wrote that since PCA "imposes an essentially nonbinding constraint on bank su-
pervisors, PCA is not likely to play a major role in preventing, or even mitigating, the
next banking crisis. For a recent full discussion and analysis, see Gillian G. H. Garcia,
Failing Prompt Corrective Action, 11 JOURNAL OF BANKING REGULATION, 171-190 (June
2010).
[Vol. 431002
SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION
the deficient prudential approach, the fact remains that no matter
how hard Congress may try, it is impossible to eliminate agency dis-
cretion. For example, while PCA limits agency discretion by requiring
certain actions once statutory triggers are met, PCA allows the bank-
ing agencies to set the triggers and to determine the inputs for such
triggers. PCA allows the banking agencies to set the capital and S/S
standards and affords them discretion to determine whether such
standards are met. In this way, even under statutory provisions like
PCA which are meant to eliminate agency discretion, substantial dis-
cretion remains.
Several studies concluded that agency failure was a significant
contributing cause of the 2008 Financial Crisis. Professor Patricia A.
McCoy documented the regulatory failures that preceded the 2008 Fi-
nancial Crisis. She concluded that federal banking regulators "had
ample power to stop the deterioration in mortgage underwriting stan-
dards that mushroomed into a full-blown crisis. However, they re-
fused to intervene in disastrous lending practices until it was too
late."38
In 2008, Congress created the Congressional Oversight Panel
("COP") to review the state of the financial markets and the regula-
tory system.39 In addition, Congress directed the COP to issue a spe-
cial report on regulatory reform. In its special report, the COP's
findings regarding the performance of the banking regulators were
similar to Professor McCoy's conclusions. The COP concluded that
[s]tructural and organizational problems are certainly impor-
tant .... But at root, the regulatory failure that gave rise to
the current crisis was one of philosophy more than structure.
In too many cases, regulators had the tools but failed to use
them. And where tools were missing, regulators too often
failed to ask for the necessary authority to develop what was
needed. 40
Moreover, a recent report issued by the United States Govern-
ment Accountability Office ("GAO") found that regulators had identi-
fied numerous weaknesses in the risk management systems of large,
complex financial institutions. "However, the regulators said that
they did not take forceful actions to address these weaknesses, such as
changing their assessments, until the crisis occurred because the in-
38. PATRICIA A. McCoy, FEDERAL PREEMPTION, REGULATORY FAILURE AND THE RACE
TO THE BOTTOM IN US MORTGAGE LENDING STANDARDS, IN The Panic of 2008 (Edward
Elgar, forthcoming 2010).
39. For further information on the COP, see Congressional Oversight Panel, About
Us, http://cop.senate.gov/aboutl (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
40. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM
19 (Jan. 2009), http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatoryreform.
pdf.
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stitutions had strong financial positions and senior management had
presented the regulators with plans for change." 4 1 This suggests that
even when regulators identify weaknesses, regulators are less likely to
address aggressively those weaknesses during the boom years.
Concern regarding the effectiveness of regulators is not confined
to the United States nor is it new. A well-known international study
of the effectiveness of bank regulation by James R. Barth, Gerard Ca-
prio Jr., and Ross Levine concluded, among other things, that:
The data provide ample support for the private interest view
of government and surprisingly little support for the public
interest view. Thus, from the laboratory of bank supervision
and regulation, angels do not govern! Across the world there
are insufficient checks and balances on government officials
to induce them to behave in a way that boosts the functioning
of banks.... [Wie find that the bulk of "hands-on" policies by
the government tends to hinder bank development, reduce
bank efficiency, intensify banking system fragility, and in-
crease corruption in lending.4 2
Barth, Caprio, and Levine used their findings regarding the ineffec-
tiveness of regulators to support a preference for market-based sys-
tems of regulation. This Article assumes that following the 2008
Financial Crisis little political support remains for abandoning regula-
tion in favor of market-based solutions.4 3 Yet, the inherent limita-
tions of the administrative state identified by Barth, Caprio, and
Levine remain crucial to addressing the effectiveness of regulatory
reforms.
V. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
Implementing the existing federal prudential regime depends,
primarily, on the activities of the agencies regulating the financial ser-
vices industry.4 4 The regulation of financial institutions, commercial
41. GAO, FINANCIAL REGULATION, REVIEW OF REGULATORS' OVERSIGHT OF RISK
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS, GAO-09-499T (March 18, 2009) (Statement of Orice M. Williams Before the Sub-
committee on Securities, Insurance, and Investments, Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d09499t.pdf.
42. JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO JR., & Ross LEVINE, RETHINKING BANK REGU-
LATION: TILL ANGELS GOVERN 314 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
43. That does not mean, however, that market-based solutions will not be a part of
future reforms.
44. As amazing as it may seem, this discussion provides only a partial list of the
federal agencies that regulate financial institutions and markets. For example, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the agency responsible for regulating the
securities markets to protect investors. As such, it is not a prudential regulator. How-
ever, the SEC's role with regard to prudential regulation has not always been clear.
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the SEC was the consolidated supervisor for large,
complex firms engaged primarily in the securities sector. These firms included Bear
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banks in particular, has a long history. The United States Congress
established the first federal regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ("OCC"), 45 during the Civil War. Responding to the
banking panic of 1907, Congress established the United States Fed-
eral Reserve. 4 6 In response to the Great Depression, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and federal deposit insurance
were established in 1935.47 The next banking crisis, the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s, brought the creation of the Office of Thrift
Supervision ("OTS"). 4 s
These banking agencies approach prudential regulation in very
similar ways. All act as supervisors - conducting regular onsite and
offsite examination of the banks under their charge. 49 They each have
the authority to write regulations implementing the banking stat-
utes. 50 And, regarding the focus of this Article, all have a range of
enforcement powers. They can enforce law through informal agree-
ment such as a memorandum of understanding. The banking agen-
cies can also engage in more formal enforcement proceedings such as
cease and desist orders,5 1 civil money penalties,5 2 and removal and
Stearns & Co, Goldman Sachs& Co., Lehman Brothers, Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc.
and Morgan Stanley & Co. Following the 2008 financial crisis, each of these firms ei-
ther failed or reorganized as financial holding companies subject to Federal Reserve
supervision. Thus, in September of 2008, the SEC announced the termination of its
consolidated supervised entities program.
45. The OCC is the primary federal regulator for all nationally chartered commer-
cial banks. 12 U.S.C. § 26, 93a. The OCC was created in 1863 with the passage of the
National Bank Act., ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (June 3, 1864) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The National Bank Act was actually adopted originally
in 1863 as the National Currency Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665-668 (Feb. 25, 1863).
46. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 1, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Federal Reserve is the primary federal regulator
for financial holding companies, bank holding companies, and state-chartered commer-
cial banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 248, 1844
(2006).
47. The FDIC is, among other things, the primary federal regulator for state-
chartered commercial banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. 12
U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3) (2006).
48. The OTS is the primary federal regulator for savings institutions. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1462 (2006). Title III of the Dodd-Frank Act will eliminate the OTS and transfer its
various powers to the Federal Reserve and the OCC.
49. Bank regulators are required by statute to "conduct a full-scope, on-site exami-
nation" at least once every 12 months for most banks and every 18 months for certain
small banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1); § 1820(d)(4) (2006). In reality, the largest financial
institutions have bank examiners onsite permanently.
50. This does not mean, however, that each of the banking agencies has the same
rulemaking authority. For example, the Federal Reserve has sole authority to promul-
gate regulations under many consumer credit laws. See generally Ralph J. Rohner, "For
Lack of a National Policy on Consumer Credit... "; Preliminary Thoughts on the Need
For Unified Federal Agency Rulemaking, 35 Bus. LAw. 135 (1979).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2008).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2).
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prohibition orders. 53 Under Section 162 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
Federal Reserve is authorized to utilize the same administrative en-
forcement powers against nonbank financial companies supervised by
the Federal Reserve.
54
Agencies must exercise considerable discretion to operate effec-
tively. This is no different for the banking agencies, which exercise
considerable discretion in their supervisory, regulatory, and enforce-
ment activities. Where there is considerable discretion and power,
one might reasonably look to find some balance against such power.
The development of administrative law doctrine can be seen in large
part as a response to the problem of agency discretion.5 5 More specifi-
cally, judicial review is available to challenge both the agencies'
rulemaking activities and their enforcement actions. 56 A bank might,
for example, seek judicial review of a banking agency's decision to de-
clare the bank insolvent. 57 Yet, judicial review may not serve as a
practical check against agency forbearance. As discussed further in
Part VI, both the question of Congressional intent to create a private
cause of action against a financial institution (when not explicitly pro-
vided by statute) and the plaintiffs standing to sue may prevent judi-
cial review from serving as a significant check on agency forbearance.
Public enforcement regimes might be enhanced without the assis-
tance of private litigation or permanent additions to the agency's
budget. Whistleblower statutes are often passed to increase the effec-
tiveness of an enforcement regime by assisting in the detection of
wrongdoing and reducing the costs of enforcement programs. The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has statutory authority to
pay bounties to individuals who provide the SEC with information re-
garding insider trading. 58 Most significant to this discussion is that
53. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1).
54. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 162(a). Under section 162(a), the Fed-
eral Reserve has the authority to bring enforcement actions against the nonbank finan-
cial companies that it supervises. The Federal Reserve also has back-up enforcement
authority over subsidiaries (including banks) of such nonbank financial companies
under section 162(b) and (c).
55. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1227-28 (4th ed. 2002).
56. Section 702 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides that a "per-
son suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1993).
57. See, e.g., James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (court
reviewed banks' challenge of the agency's decision to place banks into receivership).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1)(e) (2006) . The bounty may not exceed ten percent of the
penalty. The SEC has rarely exercised its authority to pay bounties. Jayne W. Barnard,
Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 71 U. PITT. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1520697. The SEC does, however maintain significant information for would-be in-
formants on its website. U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Insider Trading: Information on
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federal bank regulators, with the concurrence of the Attorney General,
may award bounties in an amount not to exceed twenty-five percent of
the penalty or $100,000, whichever is less. 59 Such bounties may be
awarded to a person who provides "original information" which leads
to the recovery of a criminal fine, restitution, or civil penalty under,
among other things, the various administrative enforcement provi-
sions of federal banking laws. Unfortunately, it does not appear that
the bank regulators have had much opportunity (if any) to utilize this
bounty program. 60
While whistleblower bounty programs may serve to enhance pub-
lic enforcement regimes, they also have drawbacks. Professor Jayne
W. Barnard notes that the SEC's bounty program has been plagued
with more tips than it could process.6 1 In addition, tips may be spe-
cious, stale, or inconsistent among informants. All of this can under-
mine any efficiency gained from encouraging whistleblowing.
Of course, whistleblowers themselves also face significant costs
even when they report perceived wrongdoing internally to the board of
directors. Paul Moore was a senior executive in charge of regulatory
compliance at Halifax Bank of Scotland ("HBOS") from 2002 through
2005. Moore told the HBOS board that the bank was growing too fast
and that its practices posed serious risks to financial stability and con-
sumer protection. Moore, who was fired, sued HBOS under
whistleblower protection law, later settling the suit.6 2 In the fall of
2008, at the height of the 2008 Financial Crisis, Lloyds TSB ("Lloyds")
acquired HBOS. Subsequently, Lloyds suffered heavy losses because
of HBOS's very weak loan portfolio.
63
Bounties, http://www.sec.gov/divisionslenforce/ insider.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
The Dodd-Frank Act provides new incentives and protections for securities
whistleblowers. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 922-24. The Dodd-Frank Act also provides
whistleblower protections to financial institution employees who make disclosures to
the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Dodd-Frank Act § 1057.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1831k (2006).
60. I have a Freedom of Information Act request pending with the banking agen-
cies seeking information regarding payment of bounties under federal banking law.
Preliminary responses from the agencies have not produced any evidence to contradict
my strong suspicion that no bounties have been paid.
61. Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 71 U. Prrr. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520697.
62. For further information on Paul Moore and HBOS see Partick Hosking, HBOS
sacked and gagged bank risk whistleblower, TIMESONLINE, Feb. 10, 2010, http:I/
business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industrysectors/banking-and-finance/article
5701380.ece.
63. Philip Aldrick, HBOS haunts Lloyds as bad debts hit £24bn, Telegraph.co.uk,
Feb. 26, 2010, httpJ/www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/7326
998/HBOS-haunts-Lloyds-as-bad-debts-hit-24bn.html.
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VI. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT MODELS TO ADDRESS
SYSTEMIC RISK
Private enforcement mechanisms might be seen as the next best
thing to public (agency) enforcement. 6 4 While private enforcement
mechanisms may encourage strike suits and suffer from collective ac-
tion problems, private parties, like Paul Moore, may have access to
important information unavailable to public agencies. Unlike pro-
grams that pay a bounty to the whistleblower, the incentive to act
upon information is far greater when the informant may take control
of the litigation and possibly reap a greater reward (greater than, for
example, the $100,000 maximum that bank regulators are allowed to
pay).
The implied private cause of action under section 10(b) 6 5 and Rule
10(b)-56 6 of the Securities Exchange Act ("SEA") has received wide-
spread attention and scrutiny. Rule 10(b)-5 is an anti-fraud rule
which, among other things, makes it unlawful to "make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading" in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. 67 A court first recognized an
implied private cause of action in 1946.68 Since then, the Supreme
Court of the United States has handed down rulings that have both
contracted and expanded the ability of private parties to sue under
section 10(b). 69 The United States Congress attempted to address
abusive section 10(b) class action lawsuits by passing the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
In contrast to the treatment of section 10(b) under the SEA,
courts have been reluctant to imply a private cause of action under the
federal banking laws. Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey, and
Geoffrey P. Miller wrote that "[a]ttempts to establish private rights of
action under comprehensive bank regulatory schemes have usually
64. With regard to the enforcement of securities laws, scholars debate whether
public or private enforcement is superior. See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public
and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (Harvard Law
Sch., Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 08-28). This article does not seek to evalu-
ate the relative merits of public versus private enforcement. Rather, I claim only that a
mechanism for private enforcement is an appropriate addition to a macro-prudential
regulatory regime.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
67. Id.
68. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
69. For an example of contraction, see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only actual purchasers or sellers have standing, not investors who
decided not to trade). For an example of expansion, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988) (allowing a presumption that investors rely on false information).
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foundered on the argument that since Congress specifically gave fed-
eral bank regulators such wide-ranging enforcement rights, its failure
to give private parties similar rights could not have been inadver-
tent."70 In fact, since the recognition of an implied cause of action
under section 10(b) in 1946, the Supreme Court has been generally
more reluctant to find the Congressional intent to create such a
right. 71
The possibility of a private cause of action under federal banking
laws suffers from hurdles in addition to the lack of Congressional in-
tent to create a private cause action. Article III of the United States
Constitution limits courts to resolving cases and controversies. Estab-
lishing standing to sue is fundamental to meeting the cases or contro-
versy requirement and, at minimum, includes three elements: first,
the plaintiff must establish injury-in-fact; second, the plaintiff must
show a connection between the injury and the conduct alleged; and,
third, the plaintiff must show a substantial likelihood that the re-
quested relief will remedy the claimed injury. 72 Moreover, the ques-
tion of standing, particularly the element of injury, relates to the
nature of the statute in question. As Professor Richard J. Pierce ex-
plained, "Congress can enact a statute that creates a right the inva-
sion of which constitutes a legally cognizable injury."7 3 As discussed
above, however, courts have been generally unwilling to find Congres-
sional intent to recognize injury to private parties in enacting the fed-
eral banking laws. This, in turn, undermines the finding of an injury
that could establish the private party's standing.
An example of traditional micro-prudential regulation is illustra-
tive. In the United States and abroad, law and regulation commonly
restricts the size of loans that a bank can make to an individual bor-
rower. 74 Federally chartered banks (national banks) are prohibited,
70. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY, & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE
LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Aspen Pub., 4th ed. 2009). See, e.g.,
Miller v. GE Capital Mortg. Serv., 124 Fed.Appx. 152 (4th Cir. 2005) (court found no
implied cause of action under 12 U.S.C. § 1715u, which was intended to regulate mort-
gagees not protect mortgagers); Smith v. Dearborn Fin. Servs., 982 F. 2d 976 (6th Cir.
1993) (finding no private cause of action under the Federal Credit Union Act); but see
Vega v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 622 F.2d 918 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding an im-
plied private cause of action under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2609-10)
71. A recent Supreme Court decision seems to bring into question the whole notion
of an implied private cause of action. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)
("private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress").
72. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225-26 (2003) (overruled on other grounds by
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com'n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)).
73. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1111 (Aspen Pub., 5th
ed. 2002).
74. For a comprehensive discussion of lending limits in the United States and
abroad, see SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at183-93.
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with exceptions, from lending more than fifteen percent of their capi-
tal to any one borrower. 75 The purpose of such lending limit statutes,
inter alia, is to protect the financial condition of the bank.76 Suppose
Bank A, under relevant statutes and regulations, may not make a
loan to one borrower in excess of $5 million. Nevertheless, Bank A
makes a loan to one borrower for $5.1 million. Clearly, Bank A and its
board are liable for the violation. 77 However, identifying the injured
party is less clear. Bank A's solvency is potentially harmed and,
therefore, perhaps a derivative claim by the bank's shareholders
against the bank's directors is appropriate.7 8 But, the party with
greater incentive to sue Bank A is the borrower that received the $5.1
million in loans. 79 The borrower, for example, might claim that an
injury because Bank A lent it too much money. However, the bor-
rower that received loans in violation of Bank A's lending limits may
find difficulty establishing a private cause of action under the lending
limit statute.8 0 Difficulty establishing a private cause of action stems
from the fact that limitations on lending were established to protect
the solvency of the bank rather than to protect an individual
borrower.8 1
A full analysis of the potential standing issues in suits involving
systemic risk regulation is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
this section does demonstrate that both the potential lack of Congres-
sional intent to create a private cause of action and the potential for
challenges to a private party's standing make private causes of action
an imperfect supplement to public enforcement of systemic risk
regulation.
The difficulties in establishing standing under existing federal
banking laws will only be exacerbated by reforms geared toward de-
veloping a macro-prudential regime. By design, the macro-prudential
75. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2006).
76. Current regulation states that the purpose of the lending limit provisions is "to
protect the safety and soundness of national banks by preventing excessive loans to one
person, or to related persons that are financially dependent, and to promote diversifica-
tion of loans and equitable access to banking services." 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b).
77. For cases involving personal liability of members of the bank's board of direc-
tors see, Larimore v. Conover, 775 F. 2d 890 (7th Cir. 1985); Del Junco v. Conover, 682
F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1982).
78. Such a claim would likely be based on breach of state laws regarding the fiduci-
ary duties owed by officers and directors rather than breach of the federal banking
statutes.
79. Or, perhaps even more likely, the borrower has an incentive to raise the lend-
ing limit violation as a defense to Bank A's suit against the borrower for repayment of
the loan.
80. See Valente v. Dennis, 437 F.Supp. 783 (E.D. Pa 1977) (holding that there is no
private cause of action under 12 U.S.C. § 84).
81. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 225-26 (overruled on other grounds by Citizens United
v. Fed. Election Com'n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)).
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regime looks beyond the solvency of an institution and toward the fi-
nancial system in general. Therefore, to the extent that private par-
ties have difficulty in establishing standing under the existing micro-
prudential regime, the newer macro-prudential rules will create even
greater challenges. For example, suppose bank regulators were to
limit certain transactions between financial institutions that are
deemed to pose a threat to financial stability. If Bank B engaged in
such transactions, would a private party have standing to sue Bank
B? It seems that such a suit would fail for lack of standing much like
the lending limit example above. Unless the statute itself created a
private cause of action, a court would likely be reluctant to imply a
cause of action (because they generally are), and standing would be
difficult to establish because the injury addressed by the statute
would be injury to the financial system and greater economy, not a
private harm.8 2
VII. HYBRID ENFORCEMENT: QUI TAM MODEL
As discussed above, the macro-prudential reforms seek to improve
the regulation of systemic crisis. The harms associated with systemic
crisis are broad. By definition, systemic crisis affects the broader
economy (not just financial markets and institutions).8 3 Ultimately,
much of the costs of systemic crisis are borne by the taxpayer. The
true extent of the impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the U.S. tax-
payers may remain unquantifiable. The figure is undoubtedly large.
Consider just a few pieces of the taxpayers' bill. The government's
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was one of the most signifi-
cant events of the crisis. The Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") re-
cently concluded that "the operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
added $291 billion to CBO's August 2009 baseline estimate of the fed-
eral deficit for fiscal year 2009 and $99 billion to the total deficit pro-
jected for the 2010-2019 period."8 4 The United States Congress
appropriated $700 billion for the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
While much of the costs of that program are likely to be recovered, the
82. That is not to say that systemic risk rules would never involve a private injury.
For example, if the Administration's proposal were enacted and Tier I firms became
subject to stricter capital requirements, one can imagine Tier I firm A suing Tier I firm
B for failure to meet heightened capital requirements. Tier I firm A would claim injury
based on its competitive disadvantage compared to Tier I firm B.
83. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
84. Cong. Budget Office, Background Paper: CBO's Budgetary Treatment of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac (January 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10878/01-
13-FannieFreddie.pdf.
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CBO predicts that ninety-nine billion dollars will not be recovered,
and the Treasury predicts a $117 billion deficit.8 5
This Article posits that public enforcement is an important but
insufficient mechanism for a macro-prudential regime aimed at
preventing systemic crisis (and protecting the taxpayer). As discussed
above, federal banking laws do not offer meaningful private enforce-
ment opportunities. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina and Margherita Saraceno
conducted an interesting study on the indirect, positive impact that
securities class action suits can have on bank stability.8 6 They con-
cluded that securities class actions may serve as "a Red Flag of bank
instability" in that such actions tend to focus on banks that take on
more risk and those that are less efficient, particularly those with
high ratio of bad to good loans and a low interest margin. They con-
cluded that the securities class action can serve as an effective comple-
ment to agency supervision of banks.
Pellegrina and Saraceno's findings are significant and warrant
further study. This Article suggests that reforms should include a pri-
vate enforcement mechanism that directly addresses systemic risk.
The model proposed in this section is meant to avoid some of the en-
forcement problems highlighted above, such as specious tips and is-
sues of standing. The model proposed attempts to provide incentives
for those with information regarding potential violations of the regula-
tory regime to act on such information.
The enforcement model proposed in this section borrows from an-
other regulatory regime in which potential loss to the taxpayer is also
a salient concern. The federal government procurement system spent
$531 billion in the 2008 fiscal year. The regulation of federal govern-
ment procurement process has various goals,8 7 but among the most
important is the preservation of the integrity of a system that spends
taxpayer money.8 8 Fraud in any procurement system is unavoidable,
but cannot be ignored. Congress passed the False Claims Act
("FCA")8 9 in 1863 to address widespread fraud in procurement during
the Civil War.90 The FCA imposes civil money penalties and treble
85. Dan Fitzpatrick, TARP Losses Projected Lower, to $117 Billion, WALL ST. J.,
March 2, 2010, at C3.
86. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Margherita Saraceno, Securities Class Actions in the
US Banking Sector: Between Investor Protection and Bank Stability (CLEA 2009 An-
nual Meeting Paper, Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No. 2009-61, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1427814.
87. Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata, Objectives for a System of Government Con-
tract Law, 11 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT L. REv. 103 (2002).
88. "Transactions relating to the expenditure of public funds require the highest
degree of public trust and an impeccable standard of conduct." 48 C.F.R. § 3.101-1.
89. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et. seq. (2006).
90. For a history of the FCA and amendments thereto, see U.S. ex rel. LaValley v.
First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 707 F. Supp. 1351, 1354-56 (1988).
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damages upon any person who knowingly presents a false claim to the
government for payment.9 1 The FCA includes private enforcement
through qui tam proceedings. 92 The FCA authorizes a private party
("relator") with evidence of fraud to sue, on behalf of the government,
a government contractor who submits false or fraudulent claims for
funds. If the Department of Justice decides to join the action brought
by the relator, the DOJ will have the primarily responsibility for the
prosecution. 9 3 In the case of a successful prosecution, the relator is
entitled to at least ten and not more than twenty-five percent of the
proceeds of the action (depending on the extent of the relator's contri-
bution to the action) and to reimbursement of attorneys fees. 94
Qui tam proceedings under the FCA are not without contro-
versy,9 5 but show strong evidence of success. Since 1 9 8 6 ,96 the gov-
ernment has recovered over fifteen billion dollars under the FCA.
Sixty-four percent (9.6 billion) of those recoveries came from cases
filed by relators. Relators were entitled to 1.6 billion of those
recoveries. 9 7
The qui tam model offers important advantages toward enhanc-
ing the enforcement of systemic risk regulation. First, and perhaps
most important, the model taps the knowledge of those individuals
with the best access to information relevant to violations of systemic
risk regulation. Second, the qui tam model avoids the standing
problems that arise when a private party seeks to enforce regulations
that address a public harm. While objections to standing have been
made under the FCA, courts have found standing (injury, in particu-
lar) based on the government's assignment of its claim to the relator.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated
that the FCA "effectively assigns the government's claim to qui tam
plaintiffs . . . who then may sue based upon an injury to the federal
91. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
92. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). "Qui Tam" is short for "Qui Tam pro domino rege quam
pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur" which means "who sues for the king as well as for
himself in the matter." The Attorney General may also bring actions under the False
Claims Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a).
93. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c).
94. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
95. For a thorough discussion of the pros and cons of qui tam proceedings under
the FCA, see Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Busi-
nesslike Government, 50 Am. U. L. REV. 627, 666 (2001); William E. Kovacic,
Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1799 (1996).
96. Congress amended the FCA in 1986 to encourage qui tam proceedings. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 707 F. Supp at 1355.
97. STANLEY J. CZERWINSKI & THOMAS J. McCooL, GAO UPDATE OF STATE AND Lo-
CAL GOVERNMENT FIscAL PRESSURES, GAO-06-320R (Jan. 31, 2009), available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf.
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treasury."98 Third, the qui tam model provides incentives that, unlike
the incentives of public agencies, are not business cycle driven. The
qui tam plaintiffs incentives are based on the likelihood of recovery on
the claim, and are not based on whether the economy is growing or
contracting. Fourth, unlike the whistleblower statutes discussed
above, the qui tam plaintiff receives a much greater stake in the claim
because they must fund the litigation (unless the DOJ takes over the
prosecution), they must bear the costs if unsuccessful, and they stand
to reap a much greater reward if the proceeds of the action are large.
Finally, law firms that develop expertise representing qui tam plain-
tiffs function as private attorney generals. While law firms represent-
ing qui tam plaintiffs will be most interested in pursuing large banks
with deep pockets that have the ability to pay large fines and attorney
fees, these are precisely the types of institutions that represent the
greatest risk to the financial system.
Objections to qui tam proceedings in the federal procurement pro-
cess apply equally or similarly to the use of qui tam proceedings for
systemic risk regulation. First, the existence of qui tam might distort
the incentives of bank employees Who have information of violations.
Rather than reporting such information immediately to the bank's
own compliance personnel, board, or its regulators, employees might
be tempted to hoard such information until it is ripe for a lucrative
claim. Second, bank competitors might use qui tam actions to gain
market advantage. For example, a bank competitor might claim a vio-
lation by a bank to thwart competition.9 9 Third, the availability of qui
tam proceedings against deep pocket banks will encourage the growth
of law practices representing qui tam plaintiffs whose interests are
focused on generating attorney fees and maximizing penalties rather
than identifying the most serious violations of law.
In addition to weighing the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of qui tam enforcement for systemic risk regulation, the develop-
ment of the structure of such a system presents challenges. The main
challenge to the development of a qui tam action to enforce systemic
risk regulation is that Congress would have to amend the FCA to do
so. 100 The advantage of a definitive statute, however, should not be
98. U.S. v. Boeing, 9 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 1993).
99. Of course, competitors often use regulation to gain advantage over competitors.
Antitrust laws, most obviously, can be used opportunistically to gain advantage over a
competitor.
100. Congress recently amended the FCA with the passage of the Fraud Enforce-
ment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). Significantly,
the FERA amended 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(2) which used to provide liability if a person
"knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get
a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government." 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(2)
(2009) (emphasis added). That provision now reads: "knowingly makes, uses, or causes
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overlooked. Securities class action suits are plagued by their origins
as actions implied by the United States Supreme Court rather than
explicitly created by Congress. 10 1 Moreover, when Congress creates a
private cause of action it may do so within carefully delineated limita-
tions that can prevent the negative over-reaching effects of an implied
cause of action.
Another challenge to a qui tam action to enforce systemic risk reg-
ulation is determining the exact nature of the statutory trigger.
Would any violation of bank regulation be sufficient, or should qui tam
be available only for those violations of law that relate to the preven-
tion of systemic risk? This Article claims the special nature of sys-
temic risk (and its potential impact on taxpayers) is a justification for
the extension of qui tam actions, and, therefore, it would seem that
the statutory trigger for such actions should be limited to those bank-
ing laws that address systemic risk.10 2 As a practical matter, this
would mean that violations of bank capital requirements by systemi-
cally significant firms, for example, would serve as a trigger, but viola-
tions of federal consumer protection laws would not.10 3
The measure of damages could present challenges to the exten-
sion of qui tam actions. Systemic risk regulations are intended to be
prophylactic and, while violations may contribute to the failure of a
financial institution, the ultimate harm caused by noncompliance is
damage to the financial system as a whole and broader economy.
Measuring actual harm in such circumstances could present insur-
mountable hurdles. Yet, qui tam recoveries need not be limited to ac-
tual damages. Rather, qui tam recoveries could be tied to existing
civil money penalties under federal banking law. 10 4
to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim."
31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(B) (2009). By eliminating the "to get" language, Congress intended
to reverse Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 128 S.Ct.
2123 (2008), in which the court found that "a person must have the purpose of getting a
false or fraudulent claim "paid or approved by the Government" in order to be lia-
ble .. " Id. at 2128.
101. In fact, Justice Stevens complained of the Court's own "campaign to render the
private cause of action under [10b-5] toothless." Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scien-
tific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. For example, the scope of qui tam proceedings could be limited to violations of
law or regulation under the Dodd-Frank Act, Title I, which is specifically addressed at
financial stability.
103. While this article has focused on prudential rules, financial institutions are
also subject to federal laws intended to protect consumers. For example, the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601-93r, requires lenders to disclose the terms and
costs of their loans. I would limit the extension of qui tam to the violation of prudential
rules and exclude the violation of laws intended to protect consumers, like violations of
TILA.
104. See Pierce, supra note 55.
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Finally, this proposed expansion of qui tam actions might be ob-
jectionable because of its potential application to other regulatory re-
gimes. In other words, if qui tam is such an important enforcement
mechanism for systemic risk regulation, then why not make such
mechanism available in other regulatory schemes? Former professor
and current Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission William
Kovacic wrote the following as a part of a call for further empirical
research on the effectiveness of qui tam proceedings:
If expansive qui tam enforcement is sensible for government
procurement, one might ask why it should not be adopted
broadly for any number of other statutory schemes. Why, for
example, should persons who detect violations of environmen-
tal statutes not be allowed to share in penalties that the gov-
ernment recovers? Why should standing to prosecute
violations for employment discrimination statutes not be ex-
tended to individuals other than the victim? .... If we dis-
trust the government's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
the enforcement of public procurement laws, why should we
tolerate it in other fields? In short, if robust decentralized
bounty hunting makes sense for government contracting be-
cause it facilitates superior detection, punishment, and deter-
rence of illegal conduct, there seems little reason not to adopt
such a mechanism for enforcing virtually all other legal
commands. 105
Distinguishing both government procurement and systemic risk
regulation from most or many other regulatory regimes, however, may
not be that difficult. Both government procurement and systemic risk
involve large potential losses to the U.S. taxpayer. When a firm falsi-
fies claims to Medicare, for example, the injury falls on the treasury.
Similarly, when a financial institution engages in practices that cause
systemic risk, the injury, too, is to the treasury (although perhaps less
immediately). Other regulatory regimes can make similar claims. Vi-
olations of environmental statutes can lead to federal dollars spent to
clean or restore the environmental damage. But, not all regulatory
regimes carry the same claims.
For example, the Consumer Products Safety Commission
("CPSC") "is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable
risks of serious injury or death from thousands of types of consumer
products under the agency's jurisdiction."1 0 6 Yet, the public harm ad-
dressed by the CPSC does not necessarily impact the U.S. Treasury
105. William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in
Government Contracting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1856 (1996).
106. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC Overview, http:/!
www.cpsc.gov/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
[Vol. 431016
SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION
and the taxpayer. If a manufacturer builds a defective toaster in vio-
lation of the CPSC regulations, the harm associated with that defect
has little if no impact on taxpayers. On the other hand, the 2008 Fi-
nancial Crisis demonstrates the impact of a systemic financial crisis
on U.S. taxpayers. The threat to taxpayers perhaps justifies more ag-
gressive attention to enforcement of macro-prudential regulation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The damage caused by the 2008 Financial Crisis invites impor-
tant discussion of regulatory reform. Debate regarding the structure
of the new financial regulatory regime has focused on whether ex-
isting agencies should be abolished or enhanced, whether new agen-
cies should be created, who should head such agencies, and how the
agencies should be funded. This Article suggests that these structural
discussions should look beyond agencies and toward other institutions
and individuals that might serve an important role in regulation. Pri-
vate enforcement has been an important supplement to public enforce-
ment in securities regulation. The securities class action suit has,
however, been subject to much criticism. The qui tam model offers
potential benefits over the pure private enforcement model. The qui
tam model has been an effective means of enforcement in the public
procurement regime in which fraud claims impact the American tax-
payer. The 2008 Financial Crisis will leave the U.S. taxpayer with a
hefty bill. Reform should consider new ways to prevent such crises by
seeking to enhance the performance of public agencies which, despite
all good intentions, will never be perfect.
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